The US recession of - is one of the deepest on record. Yet it did not produce a global depressionquite unlike . According to the standard view, this reflected an unfettering of central banking after the collapse of the international gold standard circa . We challenge this view. While Germany and a couple of Central and Eastern European countries were sheltered by binding exchange controls, most countries were still constrained by their golden fetters, as our new exchange rate regime classification suggests. The underlying policy regime was surprisingly similar to that of the - downturn. What mattered was a quick reversal in US policy in  and, for many countries, a more plentiful stock of international reserves.
amounted to only . per cent compared to . per cent in . The US recession had its impact, but the fear of another depression proved overly pessimistic. Recovery was in full swing by the end of .
Why were the global repercussions of the US slump in  less severe than in ? The standard view is that all major countries had abandoned the gold standard and enjoyed more policy freedom. Accordingly, Germany and Japan were shielded by tight capital controls and therefore able to maintain their high level of defence spending, Britain could start a big rearmament programme and absorb the deflationary shock of the US economy thanks to its floating exchange rate regime, and a number of other countries, namely in Europe and Latin America, reacted to the US slump by introducing capital controls or letting their currencies depreciate (Eichengreen , pp. -) .
This article challenges the standard view. While it is beyond doubt that Germany and a couple of Central and Eastern European countries were in fact able to protect themselves by maintaining or imposing tight capital controls, most countries were still constrained by their golden fetters. Britain and the sterling bloc as well as a number of small countries did not have much room for manoeuvre when the US recession affected the world economy. Most members of the sterling bloc -in particular Australia and Indiadefended and kept their sterling parities while in - they had devalued their currencies. Neither was the British rearmament programme too big to violate the rules of the gold standard. Additionally, the fact that some Latin American countries let their currencies weaken is not an argument for a reformed international monetary system; they had pursued the same exchange-rate policy in -.
We obtain supporting results from a de facto classification of exchange-rate regimes during the interwar years, tests on the effectiveness of capital controls and a descriptive analysis of British fiscal policy in the s. The classification suggests that most countries in the s quickly returned to fixed exchange-rate regimes after halting gold convertibility. They had broken their golden fetters in order to devalue their currencies, not to abandon the gold standard altogether. Germany is an exception, not a typical case; most countries with capital controls loosened them over the course of the decade, in part because they did not have the means to enforce them (Gordon ) . The global reserve position improved thanks to large-scale devaluations of all major currencies and their major trading partners between  and .
This article has implications for the conventional view of the international monetary system of the interwar years. The s should be viewed as a key link between the gold standard and Bretton Woods rather than a temporary digression from fixed exchange rates. The  agreement in New Hampshire codified what had already become common practice in the s. From a longer-term viewpoint, floating currencies based on fiat money would have to await the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early s. This was the key twentieth-century paradigm shift in the international monetary system.
The article has five parts. Section I discusses parallels and differences between - and - in the US and at the global level and summarises the standard view of why there was no global recession in . Sections II and III present our classification scheme of exchange-rate regimes and capital controls, illustrated by some country examples. Section IV discusses the British case by comparing the freedom of fiscal policy under the classical gold standard and in the late s. The concluding section highlights implications for the history of the international monetary system between the gold exchange standard and Bretton Woods.
I
In early , the outlook for the world economy could not have been better. The BIS observed in its annual report that 'for the first time since the beginning of the depression practically every important sphere of business has been brought into the upward movement' (BIS , p. ). World industrial production and the physical volume of global trade had finally approached the level of  (Lary , pp.  and ). Also, the threat of deflation had become much weaker. In , world prices for food and raw materials had increased for the first time since the beginning of the crisis, and world prices for manufactures were at least not falling anymore (Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo , p. ) . And finally, tensions within the international monetary system had become less serious since the devaluation of the French, Dutch and Swiss currencies and the conclusion of the Tripartite Agreement in September .
Just as the sense of relief was growing, the US economy experienced a severe setback. From July  to May  industrial production declined by  per cent, the Dow Jones Industrial Average by  per cent. 3 And as the economic contraction immediately affected the labour market -the unemployment rate jumped from  to  per cent -the ruling Democrats were promptly punished in the mid-term elections of November . 4 For the first time since  they lost seats both in the House of Representatives and the Senate (Freidel , p. ) . The unexpected economic downturn proved to be a huge burden for the Roosevelt administration and its New Deal agenda.
The breakdown of economic activity between the summer of  and the spring of  was even more dramatic than during the first phase of the Great Depression. As noted, industrial production contracted by  per cent, whereas its decline between the summer of  and the spring of  amounted to only  per cent (Figure ; Freidel ) . 'In the fall of ', a contemporary observer wrote, 'industrial production began the sharpest drop on record, and by the end of the year most of the increase from the middle of  had been wiped out' (Lary , p. ).
Likewise, the fall of the Dow Jones Industrial Average was more accentuated in -, although the crash of October  has been memorised as one of the worst crises in the entire history of Wall Street. 5 The causes of the recession are not entirely clear. One view is that a combination of fiscal contraction and monetary tightening had a devastating effect on business and consumer confidence against the background of a still fragile recovery. 6 Another view highlights rising labour costs following the Wagner Act of  which curtailed the means of employers in their actions against labour unions (Cole and Ohanian ) . In a similar vein, the BIS observed in  that there can be 'no doubt that the rise in costs of production was one of the main causes of the precipitous decline in industrial activity of the United States during the second half of ' (BIS , p. ).
It is beyond the reach of this article to provide a sweeping discussion of this debate. 7 It is clear, however, that starting in the third quarter of , monetary policy had at least some negative effect. As the rise of wholesale prices had accelerated, there was a growing sense among the Board of Governors that a new speculative bubble was in the making, similar to the one that occurred in the second half of the s. The Roosevelt administration supported the Fed by issuing public statements warning of inflation. From August  to May , the central bank gradually increased reserve requirements for banks in order to reduce the high level of excess reserves which was considered as a potential source of future inflation. 8 Moreover, in December , the US Treasury decided to sterilise gold inflows. Gold sterilisation led to a reduction of the money stock, and the increase of reserve requirements induced banks to curtail their financing of firms, 'with visible effects on interest rates' (Velde , p. ). In , fiscal policy also became less expansionary. An increase in income tax rates, the beginning of the Social Security taxation and the introduction of a tax on undistributed profits raised revenues, while an early payout of bonuses to World War I veterans before the elections of  reduced spending. Altogether, government expenditure contracted by . per cent of GDP. 9 As John Maynard Keynes wrote to an American friend in November , 'it should have been obvious that, as soon as the Government began spending less, and as soon as the pace of improvement was somewhat moderated, a setback was entirely inevitable '. 10 As far as recovery is concerned, there is a broad scholarly consensus. In early , the US authorities changed gears and initiated expansionary policies. At the end of February, the Treasury ended the gold sterilisation programme. In April, Roosevelt announced a lowering of reserve requirements and a large increase in spending. Again, the communication towards the public was loud and open. At a press conference in mid-February , President Roosevelt explained 'that achievement of permanent prosperity depends on raising general price levels to those prevailing in '. The Chicago Daily Tribune, for example, ran a headline on page  saying 'Hope Inflation Will Halt Depression'. Three days later, Roosevelt repeated his call for inflation. 11 In the summer of , the downward trend was quickly reversed. Industrial production and prices began to rise again.
Whatever the exact causes, they clearly differed from those initiating the contraction starting in the late s. 12 Nevertheless, as in -, the immediate consequences for the world economy were the same, namely a sharp reduction of world demand and world prices of raw materials. US real imports fell  per cent in both shocks (measured peak-to-trough in each -month interval). 13 Real global commodity prices dropped  per cent peak-to-trough in the  months of - compared to  per cent (peak-to-trough) in the  months of -. 14 The economic situation of countries outside the US was further complicated by the reversal of capital movements. While in the last quarter of  and in the first two quarters of  investors exported  million US dollars from the US, almost the same amount of capital ( million dollars) returned in the third and fourth quarter of  when economic growth outside the US slowed down (BIS /, p.  and BIS /, pp. ,  and ). The reversal of capital movements was also precipitated by growing political tensions in Europe. Similarly, in - countries outside the US had been confronted with capital outflows.
In both episodes, the Federal Reserve was required to cover  per cent of its notes with gold. It is clear that this covering statute did not constitute a policy constraint in the  crisis -gold inflows up to this point had pushed the level of 'active' gold (i.e. gold beyond that needed to cover notes) to a record high of nearly . billion dollars, with the Treasury sterilising gold accumulations (Brockie , p. ). Regarding the - episode, the  per cent cover requirement is more contentious. The New York Fed's gold holdings were at times uncomfortably near the  per cent minimum, which some see as limiting the Fed's room of manoeuvre, since it was not willing to jeopardise the gold standard (Eichengreen , p. ). Others argue that the Fed could have initiated an expansionary policy (including lenderof-last-resort) without upsetting the dollar's peg to gold (Hsieh and Romer ) .
Yet, in contrast to , the world economy experienced only a mild recession in . Real GDP declined by . per cent against . per cent in  ( Figure ) . 15 Focusing on the world economy outside the US shows that real GDP in  even grew slightly by . per cent against −. per cent in . In addition, we observe a large divergence on the country level, whereas in  all major economies were entering a recession. Germany, then the second largest capitalist economy of the world ( per cent of US GDP), grew by . per cent, whereas in  it had shrunk by . per cent. Britain, the third largest capitalist economy, did better in  (+. per cent) than in , although the recession of  had not been particularly severe (−. per cent). Of the large European economies only France experienced negative GDP growth (−. per cent), but far less than in  (−. per cent).
Real import data show that most countries were more reluctant to transmit the US shock to their domestic economies in - than in -. Figure  reports the percentage of year-on-year declines in real imports for a -month period in each downturn centred on the peak of US industrial production, seasonally adjusted, by country. Only Switzerland and Chile had a higher incidence of falling real imports in the - cycle compared to -. Conversely, because the world outside the US maintained a relatively high level of imports, American exports declined by only  per cent in  against  per cent in . Clearly, an accommodating stance in most large economies prevented a further contraction of world demand.
How can we explain that the large European economies and Japan chose to cushion the demand and price shock stemming from the collapse of US industrial Note: Each point reports year-on-year decline in imports during a -month period centred on the peak of the US industrial production index (seasonally adjusted), as a percentage of all observations (usually ). For example, nearly % of monthly observations of imports for Germany in the first recession were year-on-year declines, whereas fewer than % of German import observations in the second recession were declines. production? According to the standard view in the literature, the accommodating policy reaction was due to a shift in the international monetary system. While in - most countries were disciplined by the gold exchange standard, countries were freed from their golden fetters in - and able to depreciate their currencies and run large fiscal deficits in order to finance their rearmament. 'Liberated from the gold standard', Barry Eichengreen argues, 'other countries were not forced to match deflationary policies in the United States with their own deflationary initiatives. There was little tightening of monetary conditions outside the United States' (Eichengreen , p. ). 16 Thanks to this freedom, Britain was able to issue a great loan to start an armament programme in , a quarter of it financed by bonds, and Germany and Japan could maintain their high level of defence spending during the crisis. 'Military spending would not have been possible had these countries still been on gold' (p. ).
Furthermore, instead of tightening monetary policy France and Japan let their currencies depreciate as they were losing gold to the United States. Likewise, several Latin American countries allowed their currencies to depreciate or tightened their exchange controls. This latter strategy was also chosen by some Central and Eastern European countries when their current account deficits widened. And finally, the currencies of the sterling bloc became weaker against the dollar in the second half of , offsetting the deflationary effect of the US recession. Eichengreen concedes that other factors may have played a contributing role, notably the quick reversal of US policies and the stimulus of rapidly rising military spending around the world. 'But the central factor is surely that it was no longer necessary for other countries to fight fire with fire -to meet deflation with deflation. It was only possible for them to pursue more expansionary policies than those of the United States because they had been freed from their golden fetters' (, p. )
In the following sections we will challenge this view on three grounds. First, our exchange-rate-regime classification suggests that most countries were pegging their currencies in - as they did in -. It is true that the Latin American countries let their currencies depreciate, but they had done the same in -, and some countries, such as Australia, even maintained their parities in contrast to -. Second, while there is no doubt that Germany was able to insulate itself thanks to tight exchange controls, most countries had rather porous capital controls in place. And third, the British rearmament programme was consistent with the rules of the gold standard.
Before proceeding, we need to treat the issue of trade openness. A stylised view of the s holds that by , global trade (a) was smaller than in  and (b) had balkanised into semi-autarkic trading 'blocs', where a shock in one might not impact the rest. We acknowledge that trade volume was smaller in the - recession than in -, but only by about  per cent in real terms (Eichengreen and Irwin , p. ). Second, rather than being a novelty, the 'balkanisation' of s trade is seen in recent literature as extending a pattern from the gold standard and even before (Ritschl and Wolf ; Eichengreen and Irwin ).
II
Flexibility in the exchange-rate regime was not the main source of relief from the - downturn. The BIS at the time remarked that 'the extent to which the world's exchange position deteriorated during the year should not be exaggerated' (BIS , p. ). The BIS referred in particular to the sterling dollar rate: 'Over the year  the exchange value of sterling declined by ½ per cent, but even so the sterling-dollar rate was kept generally within about  per cent of the old par, while inside the sterling area itself no single defection occurred. ' In fact, from the outbreak of the US recession in June  to June  when Roosevelt had already changed course, the dollar rate of sterling remained completely stable, while overall UK exports declined by  per cent. It was only in the second half of  that sterling depreciated . per cent against the dollar. In this period US imports increased at a fast rate. It would be hard to argue that the UK was able to cushion the US shock for the sterling area thanks to its flexible exchange rate against the dollar.
The League of Nations Yearbook / includes a table of  countries which, having left the gold standard, re-pegged their currency. 17 We see this tabulation as a contemporary acknowledgement of pegging. However, it does not go far enough. Some pegs are not reported; others are reported as adopted at dates beyond what we would consider a reasonable standard of pegging. The literature on de facto exchange-rate-regime classification offers a number of algorithms for inferring an exchange rate peg. While a review is beyond the scope of this article, a differentiating feature in the literature is the basis for judgement (Calvo and Reinhart ) . Classification algorithms can measure exchange-rate outcomes, exchange-rate intentions, or both. 18 We adopt the outcome-based algorithm of Urban (), which is very close to that of Shambaugh (). The differences between them are () Urban uses weekly rather than monthly observations and () Urban codes every observation on a rolling basis, whereas Shambaugh codes on a year-by-year basis. We code an observation as pegged if the current plus future  weeks lie within a ± percentage point band. As in Shambaugh (), this is defined as the difference between the maximum and minimum of the log of the exchange rate, which must not exceed .. As in Shambaugh (), we accommodate a one-time peg change as consistent with a pegged regime, if the prior six months ( weeks) and following six months exhibit less than  per cent weekly changes. 19 Details of our coding algorithm are available from the authors.
Having considered a variety of numeraires (the US dollar, UK pound sterling and French franc), it is clear that, outside the sterling bloc, most authorities are in fact pegging to gold. 20 We therefore report a gold exchange rate index for each country, which tracks movement of the local currency against the dollar from  up to  inclusive, the French franc from  to  inclusive, and the dollar from  till  August . For those interested in comparing dollar-pegging to sterling-pegging in the s, this gold index should be interpreted as a dollarpeg. 21 In Appendix , we report the results of our peg tests. This appendix reports the countries which pegged to sterling and those which pegged to the dollar (the gold index). There are  exchange-rate regimes in the dataset: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, HK, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. Figure  reports the percentage of observations coded as pegged per year, stacked by gold-convertibility. 'Pre-gold' are observations for regimes prior to taking up the gold standard and regimes, like Spain's and China's, which never took up the gold standard. 'Post-gold' are regimes which have left the gold standard. 22 The algorithm picks the appropriate peg for each -week period: an observation is coded 'pegged' if the peg criteria are met using either the gold index or the exchange rate against sterling. This is an appropriate algorithmic choice: it allows the data to speak for itself and we agree with Shambaugh () that a float is unlikely to masquerade as a peg if it meets the -week ± per cent corridor criterion.
Floating seems to have existed only before adoption of the gold standard, mostly occurring immediately after World War I. Afterwards, there was essentially one exchange-rate regime: pegged. Gold convertibility is a separate matter. Countries which went off gold did not move to a float. The dollar's devaluation in  caused much disruption, but by  pegging was as common as at the peak of the gold standard. 19 In Shambaugh (), a one-off peg adjustment is allowed if the  other monthly observations during the year have zero per cent change. We follow the less-than-% approach due to the finer granularity of our data. 20 Our bilateral exchange rate data are from Global Financial Data and we derive the necessary crossrates. 21 See Eichengreen and Flandreau () on the relative status of the dollar and sterling as international currencies in the s. 22 Coding for gold convertibility follows Officer () by year. Within-year, the start of gold convertibility is defined as the final observation of % or greater change in the USD exchange rate. The end date of gold convertibility is taken from League of Nations (), p. .
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III
It is true that capital controls were a new feature of the post-gold-standard regimes.
Were they responsible for cushioning the shock emanating from the US in /? According to Gordon (), exchange controls could be either 'mild' or 'severe', the former characterised by 'a general supervision of applications to purchase foreign exchange' (Gordon , p. ). These mild controls were adopted by the UK, Finland, USA, Belgium, Luxembourg and, until January , Japan and, until May , Italy. 'Severe' regulations 'required the surrender of foreign balances accruing from exports'. These included Austria, Germany, Hungary, Argentina, Italy, Ecuador, Poland, Portugal, Chile, Bulgaria, Uruguay and Denmark. Gordon notes, however, that 'outside of Germany, Italy and Japan, a substantial degree of relaxation of exchange control had been achieved' by the mid-s (, p. ). This suggests that capital controls for the majority of countries offered weak protection from the / shock. Using League of Nations coding for exchange restrictions, Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor find that central banks after  follow a blended Franco-US interest rate regardless of exchange-control status (Obstfeld et al. , p. ). 23 Using a similar coding source, we break down our sample into open-and closed-capital 
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at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565011000308 account regimes, repeat our exchange-rate-regime classification algorithm, and explore the matter further by looking at countries singly. 24 Figure  reports goldpegging countries' base-rate co-movement with a gold interest rate. 25 Hungary's base rate, for example, follows closely on the gold interest rate irrespective of gold convertibility. Hungary suspended the gold standard in the week of  July . Our algorithm shows it pegging the exchange rate to gold until switching to sterling in the week of  March . Its central bank interest rate is consistent with this policy. 26 Figure . Central bank discount rates, gold-pegging observations Source: Global Financial Data. Note: The graph shows the local central bank discount rate plotted against a Franco-US hybrid interest rate ('GOLD rate'). The plots are limited to observations for which the country is identified as pegging to a gold-hybrid exchange rate in the period -. 24 Our source for exchange controls is League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook / (Geneva, ), pp.
-: 'Measures affecting exchange rates, Legal value of currencies and the valuation of gold reserves.' In , % of observations are exchange-controlled, rising to % by . 25 Whereas Obstfeld et al. () take the average of US and French interest rate changes in the -, our gold interest rate time series is the US rate until . Thereafter it is proportionately modified by the change in the French interest rate to end , and thereafter by the change in the US interest rate. 26 Please see Appendix I for the dates of gold convertibility and currency pegging in our dataset. Cointegration tests suggested by Johansen (), carried out in Stata, cannot reject the null hypothesis of at least one cointegrating relationship between the local discount rate and the gold interest rate for all of the gold-pegging countries except Chile, for country-specific timespans that encompass the gold standard and the post-gold period.
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Testing capital mobility within the sterling bloc cannot be done on the basis of discount rate changes as the UK Bank rate was essentially unchanging from mid-, at  per cent. We therefore assess the openness of sterling-peg capital accounts by the volatility of their reserve holdings. If reserve volatility increases under periods of market stress, it can be inferred that reserves are being deployed to defend the peg; the greater the use of reserves, the less effective is the protection conferred by exchange controls. Figure  reports the coefficient of variation of reserve holdings of sterling-peg countries (as identified by our classification algorithm). The comparator is Germany, which had an unambiguously unconvertible currency. At the peak of market stress, in -, almost all sterling-bloc reserves volatility observations exceed Germany's.
Thus, even though some countries officially maintained exchange controls, they were not able to pursue an independent monetary policy. A case in point is Denmark. According to the classification by the League of Nations, the Danish authorities had introduced capital controls as early as . Yet Denmark, as pointed out by Nurkse (), inflated the economy behind the protection of exchange controls, while pegging to sterling at the beginning of the decade (Nurkse , pp. -). Because its controls were easily evaded on the current account, the decline in reserves by  forced the authorities to tighten policy. In other words: it had to sacrifice 
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at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565011000308 policy independence in order to maintain its peg to sterling; capital controls were too weak to protect the peg.
We argue that capital controls played a minor role in cushioning the US shock in -. They were relevant for the monetary policy of Japan, Germany, and a number of Central and Eastern countries entertaining close trade relations with Germany. 27 There must have been additional reasons why the world economy did not suffer from a severe recession in  as it had in . We now turn to the UK to explore these additional factors.
IV
The UK did not impose tight capital controls (like Germany) nor did it resort to a substantial depreciation of its currency (like France) to cushion the demand and price shock originating from the US in the second half of . Accordingly, the crisis was immediately felt across the Atlantic. Between the summer of  and the summer of  UK industrial production declined by  per cent, wholesale prices dropped by more than  per cent, and the number of unemployed insured workers increased from  to  per cent. The reduction of industrial production in - was almost identical to that in -. Nevertheless, the economy as a whole maintained a positive growth rate of . per cent in , while in  it had shrunk by . per cent.
According to Eichengreen (), the drop in foreign demand was compensated by a large increase in defence spending which would not have been possible under the gold standard. There is no disagreement with regard to the first part of Eichengreen's argument. As Table  shows, government spending in  and  increased by £ million and £ million respectively, reaching a record level of £ million. Rising expenditure on rearmament was the main driver: in  defence spending rose by £ million and in  by £ million to a total of £ million (all figures are in  prices) (Thomas , p. ). 28 'In the absence of rearmament', writes Mark Thomas, 'the  recession would have bit harder and deeper into the gains in employment and output made over the previous five years' (Thomas , p. ) .
The second part of Eichengreen's argument, however, appears to overstate the constraints of the gold standard. In , defence expenditure accounted for less than  per cent of GNP (compared to  per cent in Germany), and the current account deficit deteriorated only slightly by £ million to £ million. 29 In addition, the UK's reserve position was much better than in -. The gold reserves of the 27 On the formation of currency blocs along trading patterns see Ritschl and Wolf () , Eichengreen and Irwin (), Wandschneider and Wolf () . 28 Figures from March to March. 29 Thomas (, p. ) . Current account figures from Mitchell (), British Historical Statistics, p. .
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Bank of England and the Exchange Equalisation Account in  were nearly six times higher than in , while notes in circulation had increased by only a third. The improved relation between gold and paper money was highly relevant. Summarising the position of central banks and the international gold and capital movements, the BIS noted in spring : 'Abandonment of the gold standard has not meant the abandonment of gold either as a means of settling balances between different countries or as the usual backing for the domestic circulation according to the cover regulations of central banks.' 30 The rearmament programme was clearly consistent with the rules of the gold standard.
Why did the British current account deficit in  not widen significantly in spite of the rearmament programme? The comparison shows that the decline of British exports was half as large in  (%) as in  (%), while imports decreased by the same percentage in both periods (%). Given that US import demand dropped much more in  (%) than in  (%), this difference is surprising. The classification of British exports according to country, however, provides a clear answer. Two factors were crucial: the quick recovery of exports to the US and strong import demand of the UK's major trading partners, namely Germany and most members of the sterling bloc, notably Australia and India.
As for the quick reversal of the US economy, we have already described how the Roosevelt administration changed course in . With US industrial production recovering in the third quarter, UK exports bounced back so that at the end of the year total exports to the US reached £ million compared to £ million in . By contrast, in , as US imports continued to decline in the second half of the year, UK exports to the US dropped from £ to  million, with the difference amounting to  per cent of total export losses in  compared to  ( Table ) .
The second stabilising factor was the high level of import demand of Germany and the members of the sterling bloc, notably Australia and India ( Table ) . As already mentioned, the rapid expansion of the German economy was due to an acceleration of defence spending made possible by tight capital controls. As for Australia and India, the high level of import demand was maintained in spite of high capital mobility, a pegged exchange rate and a widening gap in the trade deficit due to falling prices for raw materials. The reason for the strong import demand was the improved reserve position. Figure  reports the level of reserves in December preceding the peak of US industrial production in each cycle, as a ratio to the average monthly import bill. Both Australia and India had significantly improved their reserve position between  and .
The support for aggregate demand in the - downturn reflects a variety of sources -in some cases, as noted, it includes sustained import demand among trade partners. In other cases, central banks actively acquired domestic assets to keep base money supply from contracting, or indeed to expand it. Figure  
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International liquidity was simply greatly improved at the time of the - downturn compared to -. This is clear in terms of import cover, as in Figure  , and it is clear in terms of absolute quantity of global reserves, measured in constant terms, as in Figure  , which distinguishes between countries that had restrictive capital-account convertibility and those with open capital-account convertibility. 31 The importance of increased reserves was highlighted by a contemporary study by the US Department of Commerce (Lary ) . This study also pointed out that exchange rate flexibility mattered only for some Latin American countries, but not for most European countries:
In countries permitting greater freedom of transactions the ability to follow policies of expansion in face of the contraction in the United States … was the result of two factors: () The enhanced position of their reserves, reflecting the expansion in production and value of gold and their generally stronger balance-of-payments position in the middle thirties, enabled many countries to endure a prolonged drain before taking measures to counteract the loss; () inasmuch as most countries had not reestablished their currencies at fixed gold parities, they were generally free to absorb part of the external pressure by allowing their currencies to depreciate. (Yet) the United Kingdom, France and other European countries did not experience any downward pressure on their reserves and exchange rates, which rather tended to rise. But the currencies of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and most other Latin American countries … depreciated sharply after the recession in the United States began and remained low in the following two years (Lary , pp. -).
Figure  reports the peak-to-trough decline in reserves in the US downturn interval (May  -June ) for our sample of  countries with balance-sheet data. These are compared with the extent of the depreciation of the exchange rate over the same interval.
Our argument is that a higher degree of international liquidity among central banks (i.e. larger levels of reserves) allowed countries to weather the - US recession without inducing their own contractions, as would be required under the conditions of a currency peg and (relatively) open international accounts. It bears noting that this point holds regardless of the status of statutory requirements for minimum gold backing of base money; these only shift the level of reserves needed to defend the peg. 32 V Why was the global downturn following the sharp US recession of - much milder than in ? This article discussed the conventional explanation focusing on the new international monetary environment allowing more exchange rate flexibility, capital controls and thus more room for fiscal deficits. We come to the conclusion that these are not the main factors behind the cushioning of the economic shock coming from the US. First, exchange rate flexibility was confined to a rather small group of countries. Second, capital controls were much less tight than official classifications suggest. And third, the fiscal room of manoeuvre of the UK government was large enough to reconcile the rearmament programme with a stable exchange rate against the US dollar.
This finding concurs with several recent studies on the post- international monetary system (Straumann and Woitek ; Urban ; Wandschneider and Wolf ; Wolf ). They all point out that the break with the gold exchange standard of the s was less abrupt than usually assumed. Most countries, in particular the smaller ones, maintained a fixed exchange rate against their main trading partners, thus being subject to the same rules the gold exchange standard had imposed upon them. It would be wrong to claim that there was no change at all. But the fact that enhanced reserve positions made a crucial difference between the downturns of  and  suggests that currency devaluation -not fundamental regime change -was the major monetary change of the s.
From a longer-term perspective, the s international monetary system evolved in a way that connected the interwar gold standard to the Bretton Woods system (-). It was a de facto arrangement of what would be made de jure at Bretton Woods. We favour this viewpoint over the alternative that the s was a period of floating exchange rates anticipating the modern, post-Bretton Woods period (Eichengreen , p. ). We are not the first to cast the s system as a forerunner of Bretton Woods. Mundell describes a dollar-based international order which begins from stabilisation on the $ gold price in  and lasts until  (Mundell , p. ). Eichengreen and others see traces of the Bretton Woods system from the signing of the Tripartite Agreement in  (Eichengreen , p. ). What we add is a quantification of that similarity. Applying our weekly rolling variant of the Shambaugh () algorithm to a longer span of history helps illustrate how similar the s are to the Bretton Woods system ( Figure ) .
Flexible exchange rate regimes did not arrive until the early s when the Bretton Woods system collapsed. Comparative studies on the exchange rate choices of small European states even suggest that only with the crisis of the European monetary system in / did the idea that small states were able to manage floating exchange rates gain currency. Before, policymakers had been convinced that small open economies needed fixed exchange rates as a precondition for stable trade relations and price stability (Straumann ) . Lastly, our story is a case of history repeating itself. Just as the emerging markets and periphery economies of the interwar years survived the - shock through a strong reserves position, so too have the emerging markets of today weathered the - financial crisis.
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